INTRODUCTION
The Army acquisition process now mandates that reliability be included as a Key Performance Parameter (KPP) for all systems. This fact underscores the importance of this technical performance measure that is applied, in some fashion, to all systems and products. The popular metrics for these systems, with the exception of single shot devices such as ammunition, are usually multi-state. Specifically, the Army uses the terms System Abort (SA), Essential Function Failure (EFF), and Non-Essential Function Failure (NEFF) as reliability failure classifications. A system abort is the most severe type of failure and it results in a system being "down" or in a non-operational, non-mission capable state. Thus, operational availability (Ao) is a function of the frequency of failures in this class. Mean Time Between System Abort (MTBSA) is most often the metric used to measure that frequency.
The gap in this process is for most programs is that the sub-set of functions whose failure results in a SA is not defined until the system is well into design or in the worst cases not until testing begins. This limits the designers' ability to allocate such a metric and efficiently focus reliability design resources to the hardware items that support that most critical sub-set of functions. It also precludes intelligent architecture designs intended to provide a fault tolerant system or SoS through either functional or physical redundancies for functions of such criticality.
The current process is as follows. The Army uses a document called the Failure Definition and Scoring Criteria (FDSC) to define and classify failures into the above categorizes. Previously, the war-fighting customer will have defined his reliability requirements within a Capabilities Description Document (CDD) -previously termed an Operational Requirements Document (ORD). The CDD or ORD is available before design activities commence, however the inclusion of an MTBSA requirement within such a document without the qualifying and clarifying FDSC provides an ill-defined requirement. This, among other causes, has contributed to the less than optimal track record on reliability requirement achievement for complex Army systems. For this reason, it is proposed that all functional requirements should be written with an associated failure severity or failure class in order that the reliability metrics of such multi-state systems are defined at the time of the requirements generation. Such a practice will enable the designers' to understand the multi-state reliability requirement as well as optimally and accurately allocate that requirement. The designer will then be able to make the most efficient and effective use of the always limited reliability dedicated resources (e.g. test and analysis budget). Similarly, when the cost and weight of redundancy is the only solution this can be applied to the most critical components. Finally, and perhaps most significantly contracts including such requirements will no longer be subjective but rather definitive.
This same structure may then be used for reliability requirements for a SoS -which is surely multi-state. The SoS in the DoD vernacular generally refers to a number of heterogeneous systems which have individual inherent capabilities as well as capabilities that are combinatorial due to their SoS relations. More plainly, a system has mobility and lethality capability but the SoS provides networking and data fusion capability that no single platform retains when isolated.
RELATED WORK
The reliability allocation problem is a classic topic of research in the literature. The notion of multi-state reliability of systems and components provides further complexities and the associated areas of research. The Reliability Allocation Problem (RAP) can take several forms but the ultimate goal is system architecture and component reliability requirement set that meet the system's top level reliability. Ramirez-Marquez and Coit [1] proposed a heuristic approach for when the redundancy allocation problem is formulated with the objective of minimizing cost, when the system exhibits a multi-state reliability, with system-level performance constraints. Ramirez-Marquez and Coit [2] introduce the use of Monte Carlo simulation to evaluate a multi-state network, developing an efficient and accurate approach to approximate the Multi-state Two-terminal Reliability (M2TR). Li and Pham [4] present a generalized multi-state degraded system reliability model subject to multiple competing failure processes, including two degradation processes, and random shocks. The condition of the multi-state systems is classified by a finite number of states to provide a determination of system reliability.
Rocco and Muselli [5] presented a machine-learningbased methodology, extended to based on the procedure of Hamming Clustering, which is capable to deal with multi-state systems. Kapur and Satitsatian [6] also addressed the M2TR analysis problem, proposing that lower boundary points can be used to obtain an exact reliability value and confidence bounds. Yi et al [7] present a method by which they take complex generating system (CGS) represented by their multistate reliability equivalents and then use the universal generating functions (UGFs) of these equivalents to evaluate the reliability of a particular GS. A genetic algorithm (GA) is then used to solve the optimization problem.
Ramirez-Marquez et al [3, 8] also proposed methods to determine reliability criticality for multi-state systems, specifically they present criticality indexes with the M2TR impact as the measure of criticality. Zuo et al [9] published an efficient recursive algorithm for the reliability evaluation of Multi-state terminal pair networks based on the Sum of Disjoint Products (SDP) principle; naming their convention as the Recursive Sum of Disjoint Products (RSDP) algorithm. Agarwal and Gupta [12] present a heuristic for a seriesparallel system where the components are binary and are characterized by capacity, reliability and cost. The heuristic claims improved efficiency of solution quality and computational time, as compared to existing genetic algorithms.
Kuo and Wan [13] provide a comprehensive summary of optimization applicable to the multi-state problem; reviewing the universal generating-function-based method, multiobjective optimization, ant colony optimization and hybrid optimization.
TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In this paper, we don't set out to redefine or improve the mathematics of multi-state evaluation or allocation but rather the process by which a multi-state system requirements and subsequently the system it self is developed. Specifically, we address the systems engineering framework that must be in place to adequately define the states of a system for multi-state reliability allocation and design.
Put simply, if a requirement is predicated upon the time between, time until or probability of a specific event or events occurring, those events must be defined a-priori for that requirement to have meaning. If the user is concerned with the frequency of system aborts, then he must enumerate the functions whose loss results in such a condition to truly express the intent and meaning of that requirement. Accordingly, rigorous systems engineering principles require that this definition be allocated along with the requirement to lower levels. That is, traceability will not only include allocation of reliability to sub-systems and components but also allocation of functional severity. This paper defines a structure, notation, and process that can be employed manually or within the requirements management tools such as DOORS. The proposal is neither mathematically complex nor complicated to employ but to date it remains only a proposal. Despite the simplicity, the rewards are many.
To this end, first a set of notation is established to communicate the proposed methodology and process. The notation shall then be used throughout the paper. However, before proceeding we first set down a base assumption that all components have exponentially distributed failure rates that are characterized by the popular metric of Mean time Between Failure (MTBF) or its inverse, Failure Rate (λ). Let us further clarify that this is a simplifying assumption and not one that is true in many (or any) systems. This method can and should be easily adapted to include other failure distributions but as our goal is a requirements framework and mostly a cultural paradigm shift (not a mathematical contribution) the simpler assumption is adopted herein. Along a similar line of thinking, we shall assume that individual components within the system have binary failure modes such that they are either failed or operating and only the system and subsystems exhibit multi-state performance based upon the functions that are available.
First, we define the highest level of requirements (typically from the customer) as the originating requirements, such as from an ORD or CDD, as the set Φ. We assume that these requirements have previously been reduced to first principle type requirements. That is, they are not tiered and decomposed but rather stand alone requirements. That is not to say that they in no way interact but simply that these are explicit and not derived from other requirements. It is also critical that functional requirements are truly functional and the often seen folly of including detail requirements within this set is avoided.
Next, if there are k requirements in this set of originating requirements and they are indexed by j taking the values j = 1,2…k so Φ j is the j th requirement. This set of functional requirements represents the full capability of a given system. When Φ j = 1 then the system is in a state such that the j th function is performed or performable as required. When it is completely absent we say that Φ j = 0.
Further, we define the system (or SoS) state as a function of these functional states. This state is denoted as Ω, where
Φ & is a subset of Φ representing the minimum cut-set of functions required in order to meet the functional requirements of the system to be considered in an operational state. We define a system that is fully operational by Ω = 1. A system that is operational but degraded in some fashion is given by Ω = 0.5. That is,
With this additional qualification of the functional requirements, we can now represent the system functional failure severity via traditional reliability methods of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) or Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD).
Next, Χ shall represent the system's components and i indexes this set of a total number n components; individually
To complete the system structure we define a graph G(Φ,Χ) which maps functions (Φ) to components (Χ). This graph is an adjacency matrix which, by definition, includes elements of G as g i,j which represent a link between Φ j and Χ i and G is of size k x n. That is,
With this notation in place, it is asserted that to define functional failure severity in the requirements generation and decomposition process of systems engineering each functional requirement should be classified accordingly. That is, the membership of each Φ j in Φ & or the absence of that membership should be known at the time when the reliability requirement is developed. Mathematically, if the failure rate is assumed exponential then we know that the following is true
Further, we can state that;
Next, it is further asserted that minimal new work is required to define the components whose failure constitutes a system abort (SA). This knowledge comes naturally after functional to physical allocation.
That is, once each requirement is tied (traced) to a specific component or set of components the functional severity can likewise be traced.
Then, when this proper requirements traceability is done and the graph G is defines the subset of components supporting the critical functions Φ & can be obtained, we shall refer to this subset of X as X & .
Since we have previously adopted the exponential distribution and the binary failure assumptions we can qualify the reliability of each component by MTBF i , representing the reliability of component X i . Conversly the failure rate of the same component is given by λ i .
Resulting in
In a requirements management tool such as DOORS, implementation requires only a requirement attribute for this classification and populating that field with the appropriate functional severity. Subsequently, the functional to physical mapping of requirements to components is a standard systems engineering practice supported by most software applications. It is done in almost every program and is certainly not a new concept. However, appending the functional failure severity to this process before hand provides a large value to the reliability and systems engineer concerned with technically defining and then achieving a multi-state reliability requirement such as MTBSA.
The 
APPLICATIONS
When the functional severity is defined a-priori the metrics of MTBSA and MTBEFF are fully defined and may be further decomposed (accurately and completely) to the components of the system or SoS; enabling an informed allocation of reliability to the constituent parts of the system.
Further and more importantly, this knowledge can be used to influence and support a Design for Reliability (DFR) approach. First, those functions that are critical may be supported by heterogeneous or homogeneous redundancy. That is, homogeneous redundancy is the use of more than one identical component that individually is capable of supporting a function or functional sub-set. Heterogeneous redundancy is at the functional level using two dissimilar components to support a given function. An example might be the use of a manual crank to raise a mast in addition to a motor to do the same.
Second, those components that result in single point failures (SPF) of System Abort severity, denoted by X & , can be identified and prioritized for assignment of resources. Specifically, further and more rigorous analyses (e.g. Physics of Failure Analysis) may be applied to these critical parts.
Similarly, more focused testing may be applied to this same subset of components to ensure to most critical items in the design receive the appropriate level of focus and investment. This is the logical components on which to invest in Highly Accelerated Life Testing (HALT) and Highly Accelerated Stress Testing (HAST). We consider a sample platform -highly simplified for ease of illustration. This is a stationary firing platform with range, accuracy, tracking, and optical functional requirements. Further, the system is decomposed to a physical component set including: weapon, fire control sub-system, laser range finder (LRF), day optical site, and IR Camera.
The requirement set is given by: The SYSTEM shall provide target accuracy of 2 meters CEP 4
The SYSTEM shall provide day AND night optics
These requirements are denoted as Φ j for j=1,2,..4. The design results in the following components, denoted as below:
Next, these are mapped via the graph G. 
However, this is not defined for multi-state. Adopting the approach proposed herein the requirements would have been defined with the failure severity attribute included. 
EFF 0
This classification allows us to reduce G to its sub-graph that includes only the critical (SA) failure severity functions. Sub-graph being a graph that contains common vertices and edges as the graph to which it is subsidiary. It is quickly apparent that component 5, the IR Camera is not critical to the system because it does not support a critical function. Now, the value of this fairly straight forward approach can be realized. First, we may allocate our reliability requirements for MTBSA and MTBEFF appropriately, that is components such as the IR Camera will not receive an MTBSA allocation; where as the others will.
In addition, we can determine that the always limited resources in a reliability improvement or growth program should be focused on the first four components, rather than the 5 th .
CONCLUSIONS
A paradigm shift is required to truly realize the benefits of upfront design for reliability initiatives. Regardless of program, reliability resources are always finite and constrained. To make the best use of those resources knowledge of component criticality is a necessity early in the requirements definition process as opposed to waiting to do the same just prior to test start.
